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Abstract: In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to 
be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of 
individual preferences is given. 
 
1. Introduction: Arrow’s (1950, 1963) theorem shows that a “reasonable” rule that 
aggregates individual preferences does not exist (unless we are willing to make some 
compromises). The framework of Arrowian social choice theory assumes that the 
preference profile of individuals is a variable and an aggregation procedure assigns to 
each preference profile a social preference relation. In this framework along with a large 
body of impossibility results there is a sizeable literature that shows reasonable 
aggregation rules exist if we are willing to relax the requirement that social preference is 
transitive. A starting point for this alternative approach was provided in the work of 
Nakamura (1979) and Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979). A more recent paper and one that 
we shall be concerned with here is the one by Banks (1995), which also contains 
references to other results that were obtained in this direction.  
In the literature concerned with Arrowian possibility theorems decisive sets play a crucial 
role. Suppose that an aggregation procedure is neutral (i.e. names of 
alternatives/candidates do not matter). A set of individuals is said to be decisive if given 
any two alternatives x and y, the fact that these agents prefer x to y is sufficient to 
guarantee that society prefers x to y. When individual preferences are allowed to be weak 
orders (i.e. complete and transitive) then instead of decisive sets we have decisive pairs. 
A decisive pair comprises two non-empty subsets of individuals with the first contained 
in the second such that if the smaller group strictly prefers x to y and the larger group 
considers x at least as good as y, then society prefers x to y, irrespective of what x and y 
are. Given a collection of decisive pairs its collegium is the set of individuals who belong 
to all the large sets and at least one small set. An aggregation procedure is said to be 
collegial if the collegium of every collection of decisive pairs is non-empty. The index of 
an aggregation procedure as defined in Banks (1995) is “plus infinity” if the procedure is 
collegial; and if the procedure is not collegial then its index is the cardinality of the 
smallest collection of decisive pairs whose collegium is empty. Note if a collection 
contains a single decisive pair then its collegium has got to be non-empty. Hence the 
index of an aggregation procedure has to be at least two. It can be shown that that in the 
Arrowian framework and under very innocuous assumptions, this index is at least three. 
Further, if the aggregation rule is a “voting rule” (i.e. satisfies an additional duality 
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condition in terms of the decisive pairs) then it is acyclic if and only if its index exceeds 
the cardinality of the set of alternatives. These results are available in Banks (1995). 
The literature discussed above is based on assumptions that allow for preference profiles 
to vary. This flexibility allows considerable “degrees of freedom” that may not be 
available once we adhere to a fixed preference profile. Even with a fixed preference 
profile there are several ways of aggregating the individual preferences into a social 
welfare relation. Naturally we would want all such relations to be Paretian, i.e. if all 
individuals prefer x to y, then society should also prefer x to y and this should be 
reflected in the social welfare relation. However unless all individuals have identical 
preferences, the assumption that the social welfare relation is Paretian is not sufficient to 
identify a unique social preference. Thus questions similar to those that arise in the multi-
profile set up can be addressed in a single profile world. Papers by Parks (1976), 
Hammond (1976), Kemp and Ng (1976), Pollack (1979), Roberts (1980), Rubinstein 
(1984) and more recently Feldman and Serrano (2008) show that if enough “diversity” is 
allowed in the given single preference profile, then under reasonable (or mild) 
assumptions impossibility of aggregation follows. 
The starting point of our paper is the single profile framework as discussed in Feldman 
and Serrano (2008). In that paper it is shown that an assumption called “diversity under 
minimal decisiveness” leads to dictatorial social welfare relations, although unlike the 
multi-profile world dictatorship provides wider scope for interpretation in the single 
profile world. In our paper we ask the following question: Is there any known condition 
for aggregation procedures in multi-profile contexts to be acyclic that can be adapted to 
the single-profile framework and yield a similar result? 
In order to answer this question we retain the Neutrality/monotonicity assumption in 
Feldman and Serrano (2008). This assumption says that if for all x,y,z,w agents who 
prefer x to y continue to prefer w to z, agents who prefer z to w also prefer y to x and 
society prefers x to y, then society also prefers w to z. We introduce the concept of a 
decisive pair along the lines suggested in Banks (1995). Further concepts such as 
collegium of a collection of decisive sets and collegiality of a social welfare relation are 
adapted from Banks (1995). Since there is limited maneuverability in a single profile 
world we modify the concept of a decisive set and call it “properly decisive”. This is 
done to preempt both a pair of coalitions and the pair formed by its complements from 
being decisive. In fact there are straightforward examples that illustrate how mere 
decisiveness is vulnerable to ambiguities. 
The index of a social welfare relation is defined as the cardinality of the smallest 
collection of decisive pairs whose collegium is empty. The index* of a social welfare 
relation is defined as the cardinality of the smallest collection of properly decisive pairs 
whose collegium is empty. If there is no such collection then the index* of the social 
welfare relation is plus infinity. Unlike the multi-profile context the single profile 
condition for a social welfare relation to be acyclic is only a sufficient condition and not a 
necessary one. We are able to show that if the index* of a social welfare relation is 
greater than the cardinality of the set of alternatives, then the social welfare relation is a 
social decision relation, i.e. it is acyclic. We achieve this by adjusting the first half of the 
proof of theorem 2 in Banks (1995), although our result relates more to theorem 4 in the 
paper just cited. We also show that the converse is not in general true, i.e. there are 
single-profile aggregation problems with an acyclic social welfare relation whose index* 
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is less than the cardinality of the set of alternatives. This is accomplished by using 
example 6 of Feldman and Serrano (2008).        
2. The Model: Our model is motivated by the framework in Feldman and Serrano (2008). 
Thus we assume a society comprising n ≥ 2 individuals and three or more alternatives. 
Let N = {1,2,…,n} denote the set of individuals and X denote the set of alternatives. 
A binary relation R is said to be asymmetric if for all x, y∈X: [xRy] implies [not yRx]. 
The asymmetric part of (a binary relation) R denoted P(R) is defined as follows: for all 
x,y∈X: [xP(R)y] if and only if [xRy and not yRx].  
The symmetric part of (a binary relation) R denoted I(R) is defined as follows: for all 
x,y∈X: [xI(R)y] if and only if [xRy and yRx].  
Each agent i∈N is assumed to have preferences over the set of alternatives which is 
represented by a binary relation Ri.  
We assume that each Ri is reflexive (i.e. for all x∈X: xRix), connected (i.e. for all x,y∈X 
with x ≠ y: either xRiy or yRix) and transitive (i.e. for all x,y,z∈X: [xRiy, yRiz] implies 
[xRiz]). Note that a binary relation that is reflexive and connected is also said to be 
complete. Ri is said to be the preference ordering of i. The interpretation of xRiy is that 
individual i considers alternative x to be “at least as good as” alternative y. The 
asymmetric part of Ri will be denoted Pi (instead of P(Ri)) and the symmetric part of Ri 
will be denoted Ii (instead of I(Ri)). The interpretation of xPiy is that individual i 
“prefers” alternative x to alternative y; the interpretation of xIiy is that individual i is 
“indifferent between” x and y.   
The ordered n-tuple (R1,…,Rn) is called the preference profile (of the society). In the 
current framework there is only one preference profile and we shall not be concerned 
with situations where society can (or needs to) contemplate alternative preference 
profiles. 
A binary relation R is said to be acyclic if there does not exist a positive integer K ≥ 2 
and distinct alternatives x1, x2,…,xK∈X: (i) for all i = 1,…, K-1 it is the case that 
xiP(R)xi+1; (ii) xKP(R)x1. 
The problem we are concerned with in this paper concerns aggregating the given 
preference profile (R1,…,Rn) into a binary relation that society may use in arriving at a 
decision. Apart from assuming that such a binary relation is “truly representative” of the 
society we shall also require that it is asymmetric and acyclic.  In the present scenario we 
will refer (as in Lahiri (2009)) to an asymmetric binary relation on X as a social welfare 
relation and to an asymmetric and acyclic binary relations on X as a social decision 
relation.  
In multi-profile contexts where preference profiles are variable, a function that assigns to 
each preference profile a asymmetric and acyclic binary relation (representing the 
preferences of society) is called a social decision function as for instance in Blau and Deb 
(1977) or Gaertner (2006). The reason why we refer to asymmetric and acyclic binary 
relations as social decision relations is because on every non-empty finite subset of X 
such a relation will have at least one maximal element. 
While generic elements of X are represented by the letters x,y,z etc. specific elements 
will be represented by the letters a,b,c etc.  
 
A social decision relation P is said to be Paretian if for all x,y∈X: [xPiy for all i∈N] 
implies [xPy]. 
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If P is Paretian then given any x,y in X if all individuals prefer x to y, it must be that 
society prefers x to y. 
 
The following notation has been adapted from Banks (1995). 
For x,y∈X, let P(x,y) = {i∈N/ xPiy} and R(x,y) = {i∈N/xRiy}. 
 
A social welfare relation P is said to satisfy Neutrality/monotonicity if for all x,y,z,w∈X: 
[P(x,y) ⊂ P(w,z), R(x,y) ⊂ R(w,z) and xPy] implies [wPz]. 
 
In Feldman and Serrano (2008) a set of individuals V is said to be decisive (for a social 
welfare relation P) if it is nonempty and if, for all x,y∈X: V ⊂ P(x,y), then xPy. 
For our purposes the following definition adapted from Banks (1995) will turn out to be 
more convenient. 
 
A pair (S,W) of sets of individuals (i.e. S ⊂ N and W ⊂ N) is said to be a decisive pair 
(for a social welfare relation P) if the following is satisfied: 
(i) φ ≠ S ⊂ W;  
(ii) for all x,y∈X: [S ⊂ P(x,y) and W ⊂ R(x,y)] implies [xPy]. 
 
If V is decisive (in the sense of Feldman and Serrano (2008)) then for any W⊂ N with 
V⊂W, it is the case that (V,W) is a decisive pair.  
 
An individual i is said to be a dictator (for a social welfare relation P) if for all x,y∈X: 
[xPiy] implies [xPy]. 
Thus if at the given profile it is the case that for all x,y∈X we have xIiy, then individual i 
is a dictator. 
 
Given a social welfare relation P, let ∆P = {(S,W) ⊂ N×N: (S,W) is a decisive pair for P}. 
If P is Paretian then ∆P is non-empty since (N,N)∈∆P. Further, if P satisfies 
Neutrality/monotonicity then for all x,y∈X such that xPy we have (P(x,y), R(x,y)) ∈ ∆P. 
In what follows we shall assume that a social welfare relation is Paretian and satisfies 
Neutrality/monotonicity. 
 
3. Collegial social decision relations: Let P be a social welfare relation. Given a non-
empty subset ∆of ∆P, the collegium of ∆, denoted κ(∆) is the set I IU
∆∈∆∈ ),(),(
)()(
WSWS
WS . 
Thus κ(∆) is the set of those individuals who belong to every W and some S in ∆. 
We say that a social decision relation P is collegial if for every non-empty subset ∆of ∆P, 
the collegium of ∆ is non-empty. 
For a social welfare relation P, let v(P) = + ∞ if P is collegial 
                                                               = min{|∆|: ∆⊂∆P, ∆≠φ and κ(∆) = φ} otherwise. 
v(P) is called the index of P. 
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for a voting rule to be acyclic is that the index of the voting rule is less than the number 
of alternatives, i.e. the cardinality of X. Our definition of collegium, collegial social 
welfare relations and index has been adapted from Banks (1995). So it is natural to try 
and see whether we get a result similar to the one by Banks in our context and if not the 
reasons for failure should be non-trivial. It turns out (as we shall see later) that the index 
of a social welfare relation being less than the cardinality of the set of alternatives is 
sufficient for social welfare relations to be social decision relation, i.e. acyclic. However 
for acyclicity it is not necessary that the index be less than the cardinality of X. The 
reason is quite trivial as the following example reveals. 
 
Example 1: Let n = 3 and X = {a,b,c}. Suppose aP1bP1c, cP2bP2a and cP3aP3b. It is easy 
to see that majority rule is transitive leading to the social decision relation P = P3. In fact 
individual 3 is a dictator in spite of majority rule since individual 1’s preferences are 
exactly opposed to the preferences of individual 2. It is easy to observe that {1,2} as well 
as {3} are decisive in the sense of Feldman and Seranno (2008) and thus ({1,2}, {1,2}) as 
well as ({3}, {3}) belong to ∆P.  
Let ∆ = ({1,2}, {1,2}), ({2}, {2})}. Clearly κ(∆) is empty. 
Thus v(P) = 2 < 3 = |X|, i.e. the index of P is less than the cardinality of X. However P is 
definitely acyclic. 
The trouble with the example above is that the coalition {1,2} is vacuously decisive since 
there does not exist any x,y∈X such that xPiy for i = 1,2! 
The above phenomenon leads to both {1,2} as well as its complement {3} being decisive. 
In order to prevent both (S,W) as well as (S', W') with S' ⊂ N \ W and W' ⊂ N \ S from 
being in the reckoning we formulate the following concept similar to one available in 
Banks (1995). 
 
Given a social welfare relation P, a decisive pair (S,W) for P is said to be proper if there 
exists x,y∈X such that P(x,y) = S and R(x,y) = W. In such a situation we also say that 
(S,W) is properly decisive (for P). 
 
Suppose (S,W) is properly decisive for P. Let S = P(a,b) and W = R(a,b). Thus aPb. 
Towards a contradiction suppose there exists (S', W') where S' ⊂ N \ W = P(b,a) and W' 
⊂ N \ S = R(b,a) such that (S', W') is decisive. Since S' ⊂ P(b,a) and W' ⊂ R(b,a) we get 
bPa contradicting the asymmetry of P. Hence (S',W') cannot be decisive and hence cannot 
be  properly decisive either. 
It is worth noting that if instead of requiring P(x,y) = S and R(x,y) = W in the definition 
of properly decisive pairs, we had merely required the decisive pair (S,W) to satisfy S ⊂ 
P(x,y) and W ⊂ R(x,y) for some x,y in X then we would land up with the potentially 
problematic situation where ({i}, {i}) is a properly decisive pair for all i∈N, when Ri = Rj 
for all i,j∈N. The collegium of {({i}, {i}), ({j}, {j})}for i,j∈N with i≠j is empty. Thus 
v(P) < 3 ≤ |X|. However given that the social welfare relation P is Paretian, we get P = Pi 
for all i∈N if Ri = Pi∪{(x,x):x∈X}. Thus once again the necessity of (some version of) 
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the index property for the existence of a social decision relation breaks down for a very 
trivial reason. 
It is worth noting that (N,N) may not be properly decisive unless there exists x,y∈X such 
that P(x,y) = N. In fact it is quite possible that (S,W) is properly decisive whereas (S', W') 
with S⊂ S'⊂W' is not simply because there does not exist x,y∈X with P(x,y) = S' and 
R(x,y) = W'. This of course is a drawback in our definition of proper decisive sets which 
does not appear to be easily remediable. 
 
4. Properly decisive pairs and weakly collegial relations:  Given a social welfare 
relation let 0P∆ = {(S,W)∈∆P: (S,W) is proper}. 
We say that a social welfare relation P is weakly collegial if for every non-empty subset 
∆of 0P∆ , the collegium of ∆ is non-empty.  
It is easy to see that if P is collegial then it is weakly collegial. 
 
Claim 1: Let P be a social welfare relation (that is Paretian and satisfies 
Neutrality/monotonicity). Then for all x,y∈X: [xPy] implies [P(x,y)≠φ]. 
 
Proof of Claim 1: Let P be a social welfare relation and let xPy. Towards a contradiction 
suppose that P(x,y) = φ. Thus R(y,x) = N. Thus P(x,y)⊂ P(y,x) and R(x,y)⊂ R(y,x). By 
Neutrality/monotonicity xPy implies yPx, contradicting the asymmetry of P. Thus P(x,y) 
≠φ. Q.E.D. 
  
Claim 2: Let P be a social welfare relation (that is Paretian and satisfies 
Neutrality/monotonicity). Then for all x,y∈X: [xPy] implies [there exists (S,W)∈∆P such 
that S⊂P(x,y) and W⊂R(x,y)]. 
 
Proof of Claim 2: Let P be a social welfare relation and let xPy. Let S = P(x,y) and W = 
R(x,y). By Neutrality/ monotonicity, for all w,z∈X: [S ⊂ P(w,z), W⊂ R(w,z)] implies 
[wPz]. By Claim 1, S ≠φ and hence W ≠φ. Thus (S,W)∈∆P and since S = P(x,y), W = 
R(x,y), (S,W)∈ 0P∆ . Q.E.D. 
 
For a social welfare relation P, let v*(P) = + ∞ if P is weakly collegial 
                                                                 = min{|∆|: ∆⊂ 0P∆ , ∆≠φ and κ(∆) = φ} otherwise. 
v*(P) is called the index* of P. 
If v(P) = +∞ then so is v*(P). If v(P) < +∞, then since v(P) = min{|∆|: ∆⊂∆P, ∆≠φ and 
κ(∆) = φ}≤ min{|∆|: ∆⊂ 0P∆ , ∆≠φ and κ(∆) = φ} ≤ v*(P), we get that in any case v(P) ≤ 
v*(P). 
 
We can now obtain the following proposition. 
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Proposition 1: Let P be a (Paretian) social welfare relation (that satisfies 
Neutrality/monotonicity). If v*(P) >|X| then P is a social decision relation, i.e. P is 
acyclic. However the converse is not in general true. 
 
In the statement of Claims 1 and 2 and Proposition 1 we have purposely put the two 
phrases in parenthesis, since given our blanket assumption that all social welfare relations 
being considered here are Paretian and satisfy Neutrality/monotonicity we do not need to 
mention them explicitly once again. Our purpose in mentioning the two properties 
explicitly in the statement of the proposition is purely for the purpose of emphasis and 
recall. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Let P be a social welfare relation such that v*(P) > |X|. Towards 
a contradiction suppose P is not acyclic. Thus there exists a positive integer K ≥ 2 and 
distinct alternatives x1, x2,…,xK∈X: (i) for all k = 1,…, K-1 it is the case that xkPxk+1; (ii) 
xKPx1. 
Thus K ≤ |X| < v*(P). 
Let Sk = P(xk, xk+1) and Wk = R(xk, xk+1) for k = 1,…, K-1; let SK = P(xK, x1) and WK = 
R(xK, x1). 
By Claim 1, for k = 1,…,K: Sk ≠ φ.  
By Neutrality/ monotonicity (Sk, Wk) is a decisive pair for k = 1,…,K and by their 
definition, they are proper. 
Let ∆ = {(Sk, Wk): k = 1,…,K}.  
Since v*(P) > |X| ≥ K, κ(∆) = U I
K
k
K
k
kk WS
1 1
)()(
= =
∩ ≠φ. 
Let i∈κ(∆).  
Thus xkRixk+1 for k = 1,…,K-1, xKRix1 and [either xkP(Ri)xk+1 for some k = 1,…,K-1 or 
xKP(Ri)x1]. This contradicts the transitivity of Ri. 
Hence P must be acyclic. 
To show that the converse is not true, let n = 3 and X = {a,b,c,d}. Consider the following 
preference profile: 
1) aP1bP1cP1d; 
2) cP2aP2bP2d; 
3) aP3cP3bP3d. 
Let P be the social welfare relation obtained by applying the pair-wise majority rule. 
Thus aPcPbPd, aPb, cPd, aPd. 
Since P is transitive it is acyclic. 
Observe the following: 
(1) ({1,2}, {1,2}) is a properly decisive pair since it is a decisive pair and {1,2} = P(b,d) 
= R(b,d). 
(2) ({1,3}, {1,3}) is a properly decisive pair since it is a decisive pair and {1,3} = P(a,c) 
= R(a,c).   
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(3) ({2,3}, {2,3}) is a properly decisive pair since it is a decisive pair and {2,3} = P(c,b) 
= R(b,d). 
Let ∆ = {({1,2}, {1,2}), ({1,3}, {1,3}), ({2,3}, {2,3})}.  
Clearly κ(∆) = φ. 
Thus v*(P) ≤ 3 < 4 = |X|, although P is acyclic. Q.E.D.  
 
An immediate consequence of proposition 1 and the fact that for all social welfare 
relations its index does not exceed index*, we have the following corollary 
 
Corollary of Proposition 1: Let P be a (Paretian) social welfare relation (that satisfies 
Neutrality/monotonicity). If v(P) >|X| then P is a social decision relation, i.e. P is acyclic. 
However the converse is not in general true.    
 
Note : Although we require a social welfare relation to be Paretian and satisfy 
Neutrality/monotonicity, in neither the two claims or in proposition 1, do we make 
explicit use of the assumption that it is Paretian. However we do make use of the 
Neutrality/monotonicity assumption through out our analysis. If P is non-empty (i.e. there 
exists x,y∈X such that xPy) then Neutrality/monotonicity of P implies that P is Paretian. 
For by Claim 1, P(x,y) ≠ φ whenever xPy and then by Neutrality/monotonicity for all 
w,z∈X: [P(w,z) = N] implies [wPz], i.e. P is Paretian.    
 
Acknowledgment: I would like to thank Roberto Serrano for helpful discussions 
concerning the paper. 
  
References 
 
1. Arrow, K.J. (1950): “A difficulty in the concept of social welfare”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 58, pages 328-346. 
 
2. Arrow, K.J. (1963): “Social Choice and Individual Values”, 2nd Edition, John Wiley & 
Sons, New York. 
 
3. Banks, J. (1995): “Acyclic social choice from finite sets”, Social choice and Welfare, 
12, pages 293-310. 
 
4. Blau, J. and R. Deb (1977): “Social Decision Functions and the Veto”, Econometrica, 
45, pages 871-879. 
 
5. Ferejohn, J. and P. Fishburn (1979): “Representations of binary decision rules by 
generalized decisive structures”, Journal of Economic Theory, 21, pages 28-45. 
 
6. Feldman, A and R. Serrano (2008): “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Two Simple 
Single-Profile Versions”, Harvard College Mathematics Review (forthcoming) and 
available at http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/pdfs/wp2006-11.pdf 
 9 
 
7. Gaertner, W. (2006): “A primer in social choice theory”, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
8. Hammond, P. (1976): “ Why ethical measures of inequality need interpersonal 
comparisons”, Theory and Decision, 7, pages 263-274. 
 
9. Kemp, M. and Y-K. Ng (1976): “On the existence of social welfare functions, social 
orderings and social decision functions”, Economics, 43, pages 59-66. 
 
10. Lahiri, S. (2009): “Acyclic Social Welfare”, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1347933 
  
11. Nakamura, K. (1979): “The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences”, 
International Journal of Game Theory, 8, pages 55-61. 
 
12. Parks, R. (1976): “An impossibility theorem for fixed preferences: a dictatorial 
Bergson-Samuelson welfare function”, Review of Economic Studies, 43, pages 447-450. 
 
13. Pollak, R. (1979): “Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions and the theory of 
social choice”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, pages 73-90. 
 
14. Roberts, K. (1980): “Social choice theory: the single-profile and multi-profile 
approaches”, Review of Economic Studies, 47, pages 441-450.   
 
15. Rubinstein, A. (1984): “The single profile analogues to multi-profile theorems: 
mathematical logic’s approach”, International Economic Review, 25, pages 719-730.  
